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HIS comment is a brief retrospective of the promulgation of the
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA),' and a more in depth examina-
tion of the evolution and application of the subsection k exemp-
tion of the Fair Labor Standards Act Amendment of 1974. Considered
one of the most important pieces of legislation Congress ever passed,
2
FLSA has undergone many revisions and amendments in an ongoing ef-
fort to meet the changing needs of society and to respond to judicial in-
terpretation of FLSA.3 The 1974 Amendment included the addition of
subsection k, a government exemption to FLSA's overtime provisions
from the overtime provision of FLSA.4
The subsection k exemption specifically removed public agency em-
ployees engaged in fire protection or law enforcement activities.5 It al-
lowed local government employers of more than five such employees to
completely escape the requirement of paying overtime to those employ-
ees for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week.6 In addition, sub-
section k provided a partial exemption to those employers by not
recognizing the 40 hour work week as the basis for determining overtime
pay requirements. 7
During the 1974 Amendment's promulgation process, employers and
labor met the application of FLSA overtime protection and regulation
with mixed sentiments. Local government officials predicted financial
ruin if Congress forced them to comply with FLSA, and claimed that the
regulations were an unconstitutional federal intervention contrary to the
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-207 (1994).
2. See JOSEPH E. KALET, PRIMER ON WAGE AND HOUR LAWS I (2d ed. 1990).
3. See generally The Davis-Bacon Act of 1931; The Walsh Healey Public Contracts
Act of 1936, The Portal to Portal Act of 1947; The Fair Labor Standards Act Amendments
of 1949, 1955, 1961, 1966, 1974, 1977, 1985, 1986, and 1989; The Equal Pay Act of 1963; and
the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993. Employment Standards Administration, Wage
Hour Division, History of the Wage Hour Division (visited Mar. 7, 1999) <http://www.dol.
gov/dol/esa/public/aboutesa/history/whd/whdhist.htm> [hereinafter History of the Wage
Hour Division].
4. 29 U.S.C. § 207(k); see also New 1974 Minimum Wage Law with Explanation, Lab.
L. Rep., April 9, 1974, at 405.
5. 29 U.S.C. § 207 (k).
No public agency shall be deemed to have violated subsection (a) ... with
respect to the employment of any employee in fire protection activities or
any employee in law enforcement activities (including security personnel in
correctional institutions) if,-
(1) in a work period of 28 consecutive days the employee receives for tours
of duty which in the aggregate exceed ... 216 hours...; or
(2) in the case of such an employee to whom a work period of at least 7 but
less than 28 days applies, in his work period the employee receives for tours
of duty which in the aggregate exceed a number of hours which bears the
same ration to the number of consecutive days in his work period as 216
hours... bears to 28 days, compensation at a rate not less than one and one-
half times the regular rate at which he is employed.
Id.
6. See 1974 Minimum Wage Law, supra note 4, at 13-14.
7. See id.
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10th Amendment.8 At the same time, labor leaders responded by calling
for fair treatment of employees and equal application of the law to gov-
ernment employers. 9
Justifications from both sides of the argument were fraught with emo-
tional pleas aimed at influencing Congress' decision on the Amendment.
Government officials proffered grim predictions of economic disaster and
reduced services if forced to comply with the Senate version of the 1974
Amendment to FLSA's overtime provisions. 10 In contrast, labor clearly
supported the Senate's version, which proposed that government em-
ployees enjoy the same wage and hour protections as their private sector
counterparts.11
Conversely, the House's version of the Amendment proposed a com-
plete removal of police and fire personnel from the protections of FLSA,
as a necessary component of local government control over vital public
services. 12 The House version, which represented a severe departure
from the hard fought advances of organized labor and wage and hour
legislation, was a blow to advocates of employee rights. Accordingly, the
left, primarily organized labor, met it with opposition.13
This divergence resulted in a compromise between the Senate version
of absolute compliance with the FLSA's 40 hour work week overtime
provisions and the House version propounding complete removal of
these employers from FLSA protections. 14 The ensuing compromise in-
cluded some limited protection for public sector employees, but also pro-
vided for a "phase in" period wherein the overtime threshold would
gradually be reduced from 240 hours in a 28 day work cycle in the first
year to 216 hours in the same cycle in the fourth year.15 During this
phase in period, Congress authorized the Secretary of Labor to complete
a study to determine the average work week for fire protection and law
enforcement personnel. That figure, if lower than the interim 216 hour
figure, would thereafter become the substitute threshold.
This compromise was an obvious acquiescence of principle in the name
of the political process. As Senator Dent explained in his Senate floor
comments on the compromise: "[W]e can work on legislation in a confer-
ence and we will finally get to the one item that either creates a deadlock
or we have to work out a compromise."'1 6 Removing public safety per-
8. See decisions discussed infra notes 125-201.
9. See id.
10. See 93 CONG. REC. S. 2747, reprinted in SUBCOMMrrTEE ON LABOR OF THE COM-
MITEE ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, UNITED STATES SENATE, 93RD CONG., 2ND
SESS., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT AMENDMENTS OF
1974, at 1931-41 (1976) [hereinafter "Committee Report"].
11. See id. at 2265-66.
12. See generally H.R. Res. 7935, reprinted in Committee Report, supra note 10, at 90.
13. 5541-9.1: Brief Items of Testimony Paul J. Minarchenko, legis director, American
Federation of State, City, and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, 93rd Cong. (1973).
14. See Committee Report, supra note 10, at 1931-41.
15. See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, H.R. 342-11, 93rd Cong. (1974).
16. S. Conf. Rep. 93-2747, at 2383 (1974).
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sonnel from the FLSA was that one item.17 The overtime exemption was
a near fatal deadlock to the 1974 Amendment,18 averted only through a
joint committee compromise resolution.
While the historical view of this legislative compromise will be one of
political necessity, and possibly even partial victory for labor, its result
could arguably be viewed as an uneven application of the overtime ex-
emption among the different categories of public safety employees. As
indicated throughout the legislative debate over this amendment, the
over-riding concern evidenced in the debate involved the potential im-
pact of imposing FLSA compliance on government employers, specifi-
cally paying overtime for the twenty-four-hour shift schedule of fire
prevention employees. Furthermore, government officials anticipated, or
at least predicted, a detrimental impact on the essential public safety
services as a result of federally mandated compliance with FLSA regula-
tions, as well as the financial impact that compliance would supposedly
thrust onto local government employers. 19
Arguably, including law enforcement services in this austere prediction
does not comport with the statute's legislative intent; therefore, the
amendment is over inclusive in its scope. The amendment swept the en-
tire universe of public safety service providers, including law enforcement
into the fray. The inclusion of public safety service providers was a result
of the much anticipated cataclysmic impact of FLSA compliance for fire
protection employees. 20
This global inclusion resulted in a long and sorted series of law suits,
which has forced courts to interpret the application of the subsection k
exemption to public safety professions, including law enforcement and
emergency medical personnel. In fact, FLSA has been the subject of
more litigation than any other federal statute.21 The inconsistent treat-
ment that the federal courts have given this particular provision and the
manner in which courts resolve the issues only compounds the interpreta-
tion dilemma.
This comment will examine the range of judicial interpretation for the
subsection k exemption and how its application in the public employment
sector. It will focus on whether the exemption is a valid exercise of fed-
eral legislative power and how judicial interpretation of the exemption
has deviated from the statute's legislative intent. In addition, it will ex-
amine the question of the statute's over inclusiveness as it relates to law
enforcement and emergency medical employees as well as the effect of
the 1974 Amendment on government employees, government agencies,
and the courts.
17. See id.
18. See New 1974 Minimum Wage Law with Explanation, supra note 4.
19. See Committee Report, supra note 10, at 1931.
20. See id
21. See Louis WEINER, FEDERAL WAGE AND HOUR LAW iX (1977).
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
While the historical background of the FLSA is somewhat long and
laborious, an understanding of the Act's history and the purpose behind
the legislation is necessary to appreciate the magnitude of present day
courts' infidelity to the legislation's underlying Congressional intent.
A. FAIR LABOR STANDARDS Acr OF 1930
Congress promulgated FLSA as a remedial and humanitarian measure
to stabilize the economy and protect the common labor force in response
to the post-depression predominance of poverty and the fear of an ever
increasing decline in the economy .22 While businessmen and legislators
alike have always met the intrusion of the legislative branch into the busi-
ness realm with skepticism, 23 there is a historical pattern of such interven-
tion in response to economic downturns. For example, before FLSA,
several foreign countries had enacted minimum wage laws,24 and as early
as 1840, President Martin Van Buren issued an executive order that lim-
ited laborers' hours on public works projects to ten hours per day.25
Since that time, legislation and amendments have constantly and steadily
regulated wages and hours.26 In contemplating the Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938, Congress intended not only that the Act encompass the pre-
vious legislation, but that it also become the preeminent legislation of the
wage and hour issue.27
Emerging from the effects of the Great Depression, Congress em-
barked on a path of economic repair and reconstruction. Spurred by the
Roosevelt administration's New Deal legislation and responding to social
agitation regarding the shocking conditions in turn of the century
"sweated trades", Congress once again ventured into the dreaded quag-
mire of legislative intervention in an attempt to regulate the minimum
wage of laborers.28 The National Industrial Recovery Act29 and the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act30 are the root of FLSA's provisions. In fact,
commentators have stated that FLSA is a re-enactment of these two
pieces of legislation.31 With economic recovery as the legislation's pri-
mary goal, Congress developed a number of specific objectives from
which to accomplish this recovery. Among the most prevalent were (i)
22. See PUBLISHERS' EDITORIAL STAFF, THE NEW WAGE AND HOUR LAW 1 (1949).
23. See ORME WHEELOCK PHELPS, THE LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND OF THE FAIR LA-
BOR STANDARDS ACT- A STUDY OF THE GROWTH OF NATIONAL SENTIMENT IN FAVOR OF
GOVERNMENTAL REGULATION OF WAGE, HOURS AND CHILD LABOR 1 (1939).
24. See Donald E. Cullen, Minimum Wage Laws, N.Y. ST. SCH. OF INDUS. & LAB.
REL. BULL. February 1961, at 1 (New Zealand in 1894, various Australian states in 1896-
1910, and Great Britain in 1909).
25. See PHELPS, supra note 23, at 27.
26. See id. at 65; see also History of the Wage Hour Division, supra note 3.
27. See KALET, supra note 2, at v.
28. See iL at 13.
29. See National Industrial Recovery Act, 48 Stat. 195 (1933).
30. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1993).
31. See PHELPS, supra note 23, at 5.
1999] 1851
SMU LAW REVIEW
"the elimination of poverty resulting from substandard wages;" (ii) "the
maintenance of the purchasing power necessary to sustain full employ-
ment;" (iii) "the establishment of a floor under all wages to prevent a
downward wage spiral during depressed times;" and (iv) "the promotion
of fair methods of business competition. '32
The history of wage and hour legislation follows a pattern common to
other welfare based programs. 33 In this respect, the legislation of mini-
mum wage and maximum hours has been a creature of social pressure.34
That pressure, in turn, has forced a plethora of changes to FLSA. By the
time that Congress implemented the 1949 Amendment, the minimum
wage had nearly doubled and the code spelled out overtime requirements
for hourly wages in exacting detail.35 Subsequently, the additional con-
gressional amendment activity increased FLSA's domain in a consistent
manner. For example, the 1966 Amendment brought state and local hos-
pitals and educational institutions within the Act's coverage, and in 1974
Congress included Federal and state employees within the coverage of
FLSA minimum wage and maximum hour provisions. 36
B. AMENDMENT OF 1974
The 1974 amendment was a sweeping change in the coverage and appli-
cation of FLSA. It substantially raised the minimum wage to $2.30 an
hour and the inclusion of Federal and state employees in the Act added
several million employees to the protected ranks.37 The impact of this
amendment, from a financial and a logistical standpoint was immediate
and intense, and local government officials made a pronounced outcry.38
The impact of the subsection k exemption was also recognized as a sensi-
tive political issue. For example, in the notice of hearing, the U.S. De-
partment of Labor Wage and Hour Division called the subsection k
exemption a "new and unique overtime" provision requiring public com-
ment on its implementation.39 In addition, the Department of Labor
granted a stay of the Amendment's implementation until January 1, 1975,
primarily in response to the government forecasts of severe financial con-
sequences resulting from forced compliance.40 As one of the employers
most heavily impacted, as well as the enforcement entity responsible for
assuring compliance, the government was going to bear the brunt of this
new legislation granting overtime protection to employees-and it was
not prepared to do so.
32. CULLEN, supra note 24, at 3.
33. See idL at 1.
34. See PHELPS, supra note 23, at 3 (stating "social pressures are the demands of
members of a given society for a specified form of action").
35. See generally THE NEw WAGE AND HOUR LAW, supra note 22.
36. See KALET, supra note 2, at 14-15.
37. See New 1974 Minimum Wage Law with Explanation, supra note 4, at 5.
38. See Jesse Katz, Madera Police Case Pushes Pay for Interrupted Meals; No Free
Lunch with Law Enforcement Officers, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 27, 1985, at Metro 5.
39. 39 Fed. Reg. 17,596-97 (1974).
40. See 39 Fed. Reg. 44,142 (1974).
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III. THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT AMENDMENT
OF 1974
A. EARLY CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
The purpose of FLSA legislation was to "restore a measure of dignity"
to the nation's labor force.41 The 1974 Amendment created changes to
the FLSA that reverberated throughout all levels of government. Local
officials claimed that the provisions bringing all government employees
within the protections of FLSA would drive local government into finan-
cial ruin, and that the Federal government was invading local government
control in violation of the Tenth Amendment.42 State and local govern-
ment officials widely supported these Constitutional challenges; however,
FLSA has "been well tested and consistently upheld" against Constitu-
tional challenges. 43 Considered to be a valid exercise of its power under
the Commerce Clause, Congress used FLSA to regulate minimum wages
and maximum hours of the national labor force, now including state and
local government employees."4
B. NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES V. USERY
The Supreme Court ruling in Usery addressed the fears and suspicions
that local government officials voiced concerning federal intervention of
state sovereignty in violation of the 10th Amendment.45 In a five to four
decision, which overruled Wirtz, 46 the Supreme Court held that Con-
gress's exercise of its Commerce Clause power to prescribe minimum
wages and overtime pay for employees of state and local governments
was an impermissible intrusion on the sovereignty of the states because it
"would impair the states' 'ability to function effectively in the federal sys-
tem .... ,,,47 This was a dramatic departure from the Court's earlier
position in Wirtz,48 wherein the Court held resolutely in a six to two deci-
sion 49 that the Commerce Clause did allow for Congressional intrusion
41. H.R. Rep. No. 101-260, at 14-15 (1989).
42. See 93 CONG. REC. S2747, reprinted in Committee Reports, supra note 10, at 1712
(Statement of Sen. Taft referring to the prior testimony of Mr. William F. Danielson, direc-
tor of personnel for the City of Sacramento, CA.).
43. See KALET, supra note 2, at 19.
44. See id. at 15.
45. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
46. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968), overruled by National League of Tribes v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
47. See Usery, 426 U.S. at 833 (quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 (1975)).
48. See Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 183 (the Supreme Court upheld the application of FLSA to a
limited number of state government employers, including schools, hospitals, nursing
homes, and transit systems); see also Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547-48 (1975)
(allowing Congressional intrusion into state government as an emergency measure to
counter severe national inflation).
49. Justice Marshall took no part in the Wirtz decision; however, he later held with the
majority in Garcia, see infra note 5, that the exercise of the Commerce Clause Power by




into state government inasmuch as the regulation related to the operation
of local schools or hospitals case.50
In contrast, the Usery Court opined that states have the power to deter-
mine government employees' wages, hours, and overtime compensa-
tion.5 1 The question before the court was, however, "whether these
determinations are functions essential to separate and independent exist-
ence" sufficient to invoke Tenth Amendment protections. 52 The court
ultimately answered that question in the affirmative. The Supreme Court
holding stated that by enforcing FLSA regulations against state and local
government employers, Congress was improperly exercising power over
state governments, and the Court simply would not extend the Com-
merce Clause that far.53 The Court further found that this exercise of
Congressional authority displaced the sovereignty of state governments-
eliminating their ability to structure the integral functions of traditional
state operations.54 That intrusion was contrary to the federal system of
government embodied in the Constitution. 55
C. GARCIA V. SAN ANTONIO MASS TRANSIT AUTHORITY
The Usery decision constructively removed approximately 63 million
state and local government employees from the protections of the
FLSA.56 Until the landmark case of Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority,57 local government employers enjoyed, some might
even say abused, this freedom from federal oversight. In another five to
four decision, the Supreme Court addressed the implications and applica-
tion of the 10th Amendment and the issue of federally mandated mini-
mum wage and hour regulations on local and state government
employers.58 With the relatively recent Usery holding that federal inter-
vention was unconstitutional, most employers confidently predicted that
this case would simply follow the Usery progeny.59 The contrary holding
and explicit over-ruling of Usery surprised many employers, not the least
of which were the government employers. 60
50. See Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 193-99.
51. See Usery, 426 U.S. at 845.
52. Id. (quoting Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559, 580 (1911)).
53. See id. at 852.
54. See id.
55. See id.; see also John E. DuMont, Comment, State Immunity from Federal Regula-
tion - Before and After Garcia: How Accurate was the Supreme Court's Prediction in Gar-
cia v. SAMTA that Political Process Inherent in our System of Federalism was Capable of
Protecting the States Against Unduly Burdensome Federal Regulation?, 31 Duo. L. REV.
391, 392 (1993).
56. See WEINER, supra note 21, at 32-33.
57. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
58. See id. at 530.
59. See Linda S. Vanden Heuvel, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority
Public Authorities Subject to Fair Labor Standards Act, 58 Wis. B. BULL. 17 (1985).
60. See generally Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968); National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528
(1985). Of the core justices who upheld the use of the Commerce Clause in the Wirtz case
(Harlan, Warren, Black, Brennan, White, and Fortas), Justices Brennan and White were
1854 [Vol. 52
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The Garcia decision effectively brought all state and local government
employees under the provisions and protections of FLSA, not just those
select categories identified in Usery.61 This meant that employees now
arguably possessed better bargaining positions, increased salary benefits,
and improved working conditions. 62 The Court's rationale balanced this
result by holding that the political process available to the states pro-
tected them from undue federal government intrusion; therefore, judicial
restraint of Congress' power under the Commerce Clause was unneces-
sary.63 While labor viewed these improved employee benefits as a posi-
tive application of the FLSA, employers did not receive the news so
graciously. For example, Governor John Ashcroft told a Senate panel
that the Garcia decision would cost the State of Missouri and local gov-
ernments more than $8 million in overtime and result in a reduction of
essential state services. 64 Echoing these fears, Representative Harold
Ford (D-Tenn) stated that the ruling and subsequent enforcement of the
provisions "has generated much confusion and will cause substantial
hardships to many state and local government employees, specifically
those involved in hazardous activities, such as fire protection and law
enforcement." 65
Because the local government constitutional challenge in Usery came
on the heels of the 1974 Amendment, most of the overtime exemption
questions for government employers under this Amendment were moot,
or government employers postponed compliance pending the Supreme
Court's ruling. The ruling freed post Usery government employers from
FLSA regulation in the areas of "traditional government functions. '66
Therefore, the Usery decision rendered FLSA regulations unenforceable
for public sector employees engaged in the eight identified "traditional"
unable to reaffirm that power in Usery, being joined in their dissent by only Justices Mar-
shall and Stevens. The remaining majority from Wirtz, Justices Harlan, Black, Fortas, and
Chief Justice Warren had all left the court and were replaced with more conservative
justices.
However, by holding in Usery to limit the Federal government's power under the Com-
merce Clause, the majority (Burger, Rehnquist, Blackman, Powell, and Stewart), which
included only Justice Stevens from the Wirtz court joined by a series of recent conservative
appointees, overturned Wirtz in a 5-4 decision. In the Garcia case that followed, the court
composition was nearly identical to that of the Usery court; only Justice Stewart, who hadjoined with the majority in Usery, was gone. Justice O'Conner was now on the bench and
considered a conservative vote to follow Chief Justice Burger and the majority from Usery.
Justice O'Conner did in fact join with the Chief Justice, and Justices Rehnquist and Powell,
but they emerged as the minority. The surprise came when Justice Blackmun, who had
held in Usery to restrict Federal government intervention and control of state and local
employers, joined the majority in Garcia holding to allow the federal government the
power to enforce FLSA regulations governing the wage and hour requirements on local
government employers. See id.
61. See id.
62. See id
63. See Michael Jilka, For Whom Does the Clock Tick Public Employers' Liability for
Overtime Compensation Under Federal Law, 63 J. KAN. B. ASS'N 34, 35 (1994).
64. See Jim Michaels, STATES NEWS SERVICES, July 24, 1985.
65. David E. Anderson, Administration Pondering Change in Labor Law, UPI, August
26, 1985.
66. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 845 (1976).
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local government functions: (1) schools, (2) hospitals, (3) fire prevention,
(4) police protection, (5) sanitation, (6) public health, (7) parks and recre-
ation, and (8) libraries and museums.67
However, the confusion and interpretation difficulties Rep. Ford pre-
dicted did not take long to develop following Garcia. The Supreme Court
had replaced the "traditional functions" test with a four part test, which
enumerated a list of prerequisites for governmental inumunity.68 The
Court found that the traditional functions rationale was not practical, nor
functional, stating that "the attempt to draw the boundaries of state regu-
latory immunity in terms of 'traditional governmental function[s]' is not
only unworkable but is also inconsistent with established principles of
federalism and, indeed, with those very federalism principles on which
National League of Cities purported to rest."'69 In an attempt to create a
workable evaluation of state immunity, the Court developed the four part
Garcia test. Specifically, the court stated that to escape FLSA regulation
under Garcia, state activity must meet the following conditions:
[(1)1 the federal statute at issue must regulate "the States as States,"
[(2)] the statute must "address matters that are indisputably attri-
bute[s] of state sovereignty,"
[(3)] state compliance with the federal obligation must "directly im-
pair [the State's] ability to structure integral operations in areas of
traditional governmental functions," [and]
[(4)] the relation of state and federal interest . . . justifies state
submission.70
If the government employer met these prerequisites, it could avoid com-
pliance with the FLSA minimum wage and maximum hour provisions. 71
The Court opined that the safeguards of the political process were suf-
ficient to protect states from federal intervention; therefore, the judiciary
did not need to obviate these protections.72 "State sovereign interests,
then, are more properly protected by procedural safeguards inherent in
the structure of the federal system than by judicially created limitations
on federal power. '73
After Garcia, many government employees, including law enforcement
and fire protection personnel, sought legal redress to force local govern-
ment employers to comply with the FLSA overtime provisions. For ex-
ample, in 1985, Madera, California police officers filed suit in California
Superior Court. The California Highway Patrol, San Diego police of-
ficers, and Newport Beach and Vernon County Sheriffs departments fol-
lowed their lead.74 At the same time, adhering to the Supreme Court's
67. See Conrad F. Fritsch, Minimum Wage and Maximum Hour Provisions in the Pub-
lic Sector, Report of the Minimum Wage Study Commission, Vol. III, June 1981.
68. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth. 469 U.S. 528, 537 (1985).
69. Id. at 531.
70. Id. at 537; see also, DuMont, supra note 55, at 395.
71. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 537.
72. See id. at 555-56.
73. Id.
74. See Katz, supra note 38.
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prediction, or possibly even its suggestion, state and local government
officials besieged Congress with pleas for relief from immediate compli-
ance with FLSA.75
In response to this pressure, Congress granted state and local govern-
ment employers some reprieve from FLSA overtime regulations by es-
tablishing an alternative payment option-compensatory time in lieu of
cash payment.76 Codified at 29 U.S.C. § 207(o), this provision allowed
state and local employers to use compensatory time instead of making
cash payments for overtime their employees earned, up to a maximum of
480 hours of accumulated time.77 Because this option is not available to
employers in the private sector, it is a significant remedy.78 As the legis-
lative history indicates, Congress passed this provision "in recognition of
the special needs of state and local governments. '79 Thus, both employ-
ers and employees are left to grapple with the subsection k exemption
and the alternative payment options as the means of regulating maximum
hours and overtime pay to fire protection and law enforcement
employees.
IV. APPLICATION OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT
A. FLSA SUBSECTION (K) EXCEPTION
The subsection (k) exemption applies to government agencies that em-
ploy fire protection and law enforcement personnel.80 While not a
mandatory provision, the employer may opt for the § 207(k) exception to
escape the mandatory FLSA § 201(a) overtime provision, which requires
an overtime compensation payment at a rate of one and one half times
the regular rate for any work in excess of eight hours in a work day or
forty hours in a work week.8' The 207(k) option is, however, an em-
ployer's affirmative responsibility and the employer therefor bears the
burden of proving the exemption's invocation under FLSA as an affirma-
tive defense.82 Since the exemptions from FLSA compliance are con-
strued narrowly against the employer83 and liberally in favor of the
employee,8 4 the employer must not only prove the exemption by clear
and affirmative evidence, 85 but must also show that its employees "fit
plainly and unmistakenly within the exemption's terms."'8 6 Therefore, the
question of whether the employer has in fact opted for a subsection (k)
75. See generally, CoMMrrrEE REPORT, supra note 10, at 1931-41.
76. See 29 U.S.C. § 207(o) (1985).
77. Id.
78. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-207; 29 C.F.R. § 553.20 to .29 (1997).
79. DuMont, supra note 55, at 398.
80. See 29 U.S.C. § 207(k).
81. See 29 U.S.C. § 207(a).
82. See Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 196-97 (1973).
83. See Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 296 (1985).
84. See Hodgson v. University Club Tower, Inc., 466 F.2d 745, 746 (10th Cir. 1972).
85. See Donovan v. United Video, Inc., 725 F.2d 577, 581 (10th Cir. 1984).
86. Hurley v. Oregon, 859 F. Supp. 427, 430 (D. Or. 1993), rev'd on other grounds, 27
F.3d 392 (9th Cir. 1994).
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exemption is both a threshold question for protection under the provision
and a question of fact for the fact-finder.87
Under subsection (k), the employer is allowed to establish a "work pe-
riod" outside of the traditional seven day work week. Such work period
may range from seven to twenty-eight days, wherein the employee is not
entitled to overtime payment until such time that the "hours worked"
exceeds the maximum hours ceiling (212 for fire protection personnel, or
171 for law enforcement personnel).88 For example, a government em-
ployer may establish a twenty-eight day work period for all law enforce-
ment personnel under the subsection (k) exemption, but it must pay the
regular rate for only the first 171 hours and overtime pay for any addi-
tional hours of work.89
The very cautious manner in which the Department of Labor (DOL)
entered into the investigatory stage of enforcing the post- Garcia regula-
tions evidences the difficulty inherent in dealing with crucial issues such
as wages and maximum hours. Following the Garcia decision, DOL es-
tablished a five-step investigation policy for enforcing FLSA regulations
on government employers. 90 The slow and deliberate transition into en-
forcing the FLSA regulations against government employers demon-
strates the importance DOL placed on FLSA compliance. DOL
attempted to soften the impact of compliance by staying the investigation
process and granting government employers a grace period. In fact, DOL
envisioned the subsection (k) exemption as a means to mitigate the im-
pact of FLSA compliance on local government. 91
Establishing a framework to apply the overtime provisions was the
next step in enforcing FLSA regulations on government employers. The
gravaman of any subsection (k) overtime dispute centers on the distinc-
tion of the term "work period," and determination of compensable time
within that period, such as meal times, and other disputed times that may
or may not be considered work. For example, in Fraternal Order of Police
v. Smyrna, the court held that key to the City's defense was the fact that it
specifically elected to take advantage of the subsection 207(k) exemption.
By presenting: (i) a policy statement declaring subsection 207(k) exemp-
tion status; (ii) an interdepartmental memorandum referring to the sub-
87. See Lee v. Coahoma County Miss., 937 F.2d 220, 224 (5th Cir. 1991), amended by
37 F.3d 1068 (5th Cir. 1993).
88. See 29 C.F.R. § 553.230. 48 Fed. Reg. 40,518 (1983) reports the study that estab-
lished these overtime thresholds. The maximum number of hours are adjusted proportion-
ately if the identified work period is other than twenty-eight days. See 29 C.F.R.
§ 553.230(b).
89. See 29 C.F.R. § 553.230.
90. See Statements on FLSA Presented Before the Senate Labor and Human Resources
Subcommittee on Labor, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 176, at E-1 (Sept. 11, 1985) [hereinaf-
ter Statements on FLSA].
91. See S. REP. No. 99-159, at 5 (1985) (stating "[s]ection 7(k) was intended to allevi-
ate the impact of the FLSA on the fire protection and law enforcement activities of state
and local government by providing for work periods of up to 28 days (instead of the usual
seven-day workweek), establishing somewhat higher ceilings on the maximum number of
hours which ... provid[es] for a gradual phase-in period").
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section 207(k) provisions in the payment of overtime; (iii) affidavits of
managers relating the preparations made to convert to a 28 day work
period; and (iv) record evidence of a 28 day work cycle,92 the city showed
that it had established a definitive work period in an effort to comply with
the FLSA regulations and comport with the hourly requirements. 93 The
term "work period" therefore, serves as the basis upon which to allow
exemption; if the work period either exceeds 28 days, or is less than 7
days, the period falls outside the parameters in which the employer may
choose the exemption. 94
As codified in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), the term "work
period" is currently defined as:
any established and regularly recurring period of work which, under
the terms of the Act and legislative history, cannot be less than 7
consecutive days nor more than 28 consecutive days. Except for this
limitation, the work period can be of any length, and it need not
coincide with the duty cycle or pay period or with a particular day of
the week or hour of the day. Once the beginning and ending time of
an employee's work period is established, however, it remains fixed
regardless of how many hours are worked within the period.95
Thus, after establishing the work period, the regulation defines the
threshold of hours worked. 96
Despite the CFR's guidance, distinguishing between the different inter-
pretations of "hours worked" and "work period" remains difficult. For
example, in its proposed regulations the DOL defined "hours worked" to
include:
all the time an employee is on duty on the employer's premises or at
a prescribed workplace, as well as all other time during which the
employee is "suffered or permitted to work," including all pre-shift
and post-shift activities integral to his principal activity or closely re-
lated to it, such as attending roll call, writing up and completing tick-
ets, and washing and reracking hoses.97
Nonetheless, this definition apparently was not definitive, because
what followed was a series of disputes over the meaning of "hours
worked" as compensable time; specifically what "hours worked" meant in
relation to "on call time," "meal time," "waiting time," and other "pre-
liminary and postliminary" activity.98
92. See Kermit C. Sanders Lodge No. 13, Fraternal Order of Police No. 13 v. Smyrna,
862 F. Supp. 351, 355-56 (N.D. Ga. 1994).
93. See hiL at 357.
94. See 29 C.F.R. § 553.224(a); see also, Smyrna, 862 F. Supp. at 355.
95. 29 C.F.R. § 553.224(a).
96. See 29 C.F.R. § 553.230.
97. Labor Department Issues Proposed Rules on Public Employer Compliance with
FLSA, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 76, at A-5 (Apr. 21, 1986). See also Interim Rules
Issued on Public Employer FLSA Compliance, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 1160, at 527
(Apr. 21, 1986).
98. See infra notes 116-37 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the preliminary
and postliminary activity, see generally KALET, supra note 2, at 65-77 (discussing the
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In addition, the "hours worked" concept defined in § 201(a) no longer
regulated the payment of overtime by government employers in the law
enforcement and fire protection categories. 99 The congressional joint
committee compromise settled on the more flexible term "tour of
duty."'1 Yet, the skepticism regarding the precision and practical appli-
cation of this definition was clear: "the amendments direct the Secretary
of Labor to define what constitutes a 'tour of duty.' Presumably, this
definition will answer such questions as to whether or not sleeping time
and meal periods should be included within the phrase." 10 1
Little guidance exists regarding what Congress intended "tour of duty"
to mean. In 1974, DOL had not yet prepared a definition of the term,
and the congressional debate over the amendment revealed little discus-
sion regarding the intended parameters of "tour of duty."' 0 The clarifi-
cation came later from DOL. It defined the term to include sleeping and
meal time if the employee was on duty for 24 hours or less.' 03 These
particular time periods were, therefore, excludable for employees on duty
longer than 24 hours if an express or implied agreement existed.'04 Upon
further refining, the "tour of duty" definition evolved to its current
interpretation:
the period of time during which an employee is considered to be on
duty for purposes of determining compensable hours. It may be a
scheduled or unscheduled period. Such periods include "shifts" as-
signed to employees often days in advance of the performance of the
work. Scheduled periods also include time spent in work outside the
"shift" which the public agency employer assigns.105
The confusion surrounding implementation of the FLSA provisions did
not end with the definition of "work period" or "tour of duty." Once
those terms received a workable definition, the debate centered on the
specific activity within the "tour of duty" and "work period." Both em-
ployers and employees tried to exact as much time from the other as pos-
sible. The government employer attempted to obtain the maximum as
much actual work time and service provision time as possible;106 while
Supreme Court ruling in Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co. and the creation of the
Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947).
99. See S. REP. No. 93-758, at 6-7 (1974). See also COMMERCE CLEARING HOUSE,
INC., 1974 GUIDEBOOK TO FEDERAL WAGE-HOUR LAWS § 306A (5th ed. 1974).
100. See S. REP. No. 93-758, at 7.
101. 1974 GUIDEBOOK, supra note 99, at 108.
102. See id.
103. See COMMERCE CLEARING HOUSE, INC., 1978 GUIDEBOOK TO FEDERAL WAGE-
HOUR LAWS § 306A (6th ed. 1977).
104. See id.
105. 29 C.F.R. § 553.220(a).
106. See Statements on FLSA, supra note 90. Statement of the International Associa-
tion of Chiefs of Police, William Summers, supervising attorney:
Law enforcement agencies have the responsibility of providing the public
with protection on a 24-hour basis. The only way law enforcement adminis-
trators have been able to do this is through the flexibility that has been af-
forded them to schedule their employees both sworn and civilian, as needed
without worrying that there is no money left in the budget to pay over-
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the employees attempted to recoup compensation for time previously
spent in allegedly work related activities. 107 The problem of inconsistent
results, which the Supreme Court cited as one of the factors necessitating
Usery's overruling in Garcia,l08 were recurring post-Garcia with equal
frequency and severity.
B. WHAT IS COMPENSABLE TIME?
The "compensable time" distinction became the focal point of the pub-
lic sector employer claims under FLSA. 09 The issues pertaining to these
disputes primarily centered around the interpretation of "work," "meal
times," "on-call times," and "sleep times," specifically focusing on
whether these activities we're compensable time under FLSA and the sub-
section (k) exemptions.1"0 Compensable time is defined under § 553.221
as "all of the time during which an employee is on duty on the employer's
premises or at a prescribed workplace, as well as all other time during
which the employee is suffered or permitted to work for the em-
ployer.""1' This definition tracked the proposed DOL language from
1985, retaining the key elements of "on duty" and "suffered or permitted
to work for the employer." 2 Therefore, any claim for overtime compen-
sation relied on the time being compensable as defined by regulation,
having occurred while the employee was on duty, and the activity (or
work) being suffered or permitted for the benefit of the employer." 3
Subsection (c) of the compensable time definition also presented a re-
finement that has generated more controversy within the public employ-
ment sector.114 It states: "[t]ime spent away from the employer's
premises under conditions that are so circumscribed that they restrict the
employee from effectively using the time for personal pursuits also consti-
tutes compensable hours of work."" 5 While intended to clarify compen-
sable situations for an employee, the provision merely exacerbated the
situation by throwing the elements "so circumscribed" and "effectively
time.... Although [the subsection (k) exemption] gives agencies some flexi-
bility, it is not enough.
Id.
107. See 25 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 1238, at 1569 (Nov. 9, 1987); 32 Gov't
Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 1585, at 1249 (Oct. 10, 1994); 32 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA)
No. 1555, at 335 (Mar. 7, 1994).
108. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 460 U.S. 528, 546-47 (1985).
109. See J.J. Director, Annotation, Call or Waiting Time as Working Time within the
Minimum Wage and Overtime Provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (29 U.S.C.
0 206, 207), 3 A.L.R. FED. 675, 683 (1970 & Supp. 1998); Deborah Tussey, Annotation,
Bargainable or Negotiable Issues in State Public Employment Labor Relations, 84 A.L.R.3d
242, 274-75 (1978) & Supp. 1999.
110. See id
111. 29 C.F.R. § 553.221(b).
112. See Labor Department Issues Proposed Rules on Public Employer Compliance
with FLSA, supra note 97.
113. See 29 C.F.R. § 553.221.




using the time for personal pursuits" into the interpretation fray.116
Struggling to bring order to the application of this statute, courts wrestled
with the task of defining these terms or elements.
C. DEFINING "ON DuTY"
The next step in any determination of compensable time is establishing
that the activity occurred while the employee was "on duty" and that the
activity constituted "work." "The regulation defines "on duty" in rather
vague terms through a series of individualized situations rather than by
traditional statutory language.'1 7 The definition seems to hinge upon
whether the employee is able "to use the time effectively for his own
purposes." 1 8 If the time belongs to and is controlled by the employer, or
if the employee is obliged to wait, then the time is compensable.1 9 This
is very helpful if the employment question falls within one of these lim-
ited employment roles listed in the statute; however, to find a more defin-
itive description of "on duty," one must travel a tortured path and turn to
the antonym, "off duty." "Off duty" is defined as "[p]eriods during which
an employee is completely relieved from duty and which are long enough
to enable him to use the time effectively for his own purposes .... ,,120
The logical conclusion, therefore, is that "on duty" is merely the opposite
of "off duty."
D. WHAT IS WORK?
Upon the determination of "on duty," defining "work" is the next
step. "Work" is not specifically defined by statute.' 2 ' Nonetheless, a
combination of definitions from § 203,122 the definitions of "employ,"
"hours worked,"'12 3 and guidance 124 and the regulation on judicial con-
struction, created a general description of "work" that includes any activ-
ity spent in "'physical or mental exertion (whether burdensome or not)
controlled or required by the employer and pursued necessarily and pri-
116. Id.
117. See 29 C.F.R. § 785.15 (1997).
A stenographer who reads a book while waiting for dictation, a messenger
who works a crossword puzzle while awaiting assignments, fireman who
plays checkers while waiting for alarms and a factory worker who talks to his
fellow employees while waiting for machinery to be repaired are all working




120. 29 CFR § 785.16(a) (explaining further that the employee is not completely re-
lieved from duty and cannot use the time effectively for his own purposes unless he is
definitely told in advance that he may leave the job and that he will not have to commence
work until a definitely specified hour has arrived).
121. See 29 C.F.R. § 785.6 ("The act, however, contains no definition of 'work."').
122. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(g).
123. See iL § 203(o).
124. See 29 C.F.R. § 785.7.
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marly for the benefit of the employer of his business.',125
This definition also comports with the Supreme Court's two prong test
developed in Armour & Co. v. Wantock.126 The Wantock test stated that
if the activity is: "[(i)] controlled or required by the employer, and [(ii)]
pursued necessarily and primarily for the benefit of the employer and his
business," then the activity constitutes work. 127 Although Wantock con-
siderably predates the Garcia ruling, the "primarily for the benefit of the
employer and his business" language remains a consistent theme and
plays a significant role in the subsequent meal time issue cases. 128
E. ARE MEAL TIMES WORK TIME?
Having established the outer boundaries for "work period" and "tour
of duty," identified compensable time, and clarified work activity, the
next logical progression entails determining whether an activity within
the work period is, in fact, compensable. The more frequent disputes
under subsection (k) revolve around meal times and sleep periods and
whether this time constitutes work or compensable "on call" status. The
original 1974 Amendment did not specifically address the meal period
issue.129 But following enactment of the Amendment, the prevailing
commentary established a three part analysis for meal periods:
(1) The meal period must be at least thirty minutes long, but shorter
periods would be evaluated on a case by case basis;
(2) "The employee must be completely relieved from all duties, even
inactive duties;" and
(3) "The employee must be free to leave his post of duty; however, he
can be confined to the plant premises.' 130
The early rationale that meal times were compensable barring certain
conditions precipitated the interim litigation, and resulted in refinement
of the definition. Mealtime is now explained as:
Bona fide meal times are not worktime .... The employee must be
completely relieved from duty for the purposes of eating regular
meals .... The employee is not relieved if he is required to perform
any duties, whether active or inactive, while eating .... It is not
necessary that an employee be permitted to leave the premises if he
is otherwise completely freed from duties during the meal period. 131
125. Id. (quoting Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S.
590 (1944)).
126. 323 U.S. 126, 132-33 (1944).
127. BErrY SOUTHARD MURPHY ELLIOT S. AzoFF, GUIDE TO WAGE AND HOUR REG-
ULATION, A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR THE CORPORATE PRACTITIONER 28-9 (1987). See also
Leone v. Mobil Oil Corp., 523 F.2d 1153, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
128. See generally cases on meal time as compensable time, infra, notes 139-75.
129. See Committee on Education and Labor, Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as
amended by the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974 and related provisions of law
(1974).
130. COMMERCE CLEARING HOUSE, INC., 1974 GUIDEBOOK TO FEDERAL WAGE-HoUR
LAWS, § 603.11 (5th ed. 1974).
131. 29 C.F.R. § 785.19.
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While broad based, this general definition fails to provide any concrete
guidance for public safety exempted employees. Specifically relating to
subsection (k) qualified employers, § 553.223 states, "[i]f a public agency
elects to pay overtime compensation to firefighters and law enforcement
personnel in accordance with section [2017(a)(1) of the Act, the public
agency may exclude meal time from hours worked if all the tests in
§ 785.19 of this title are met.' 32 This would only allow the employer to
meet the criteria of § 785.19 only if it complies with § 207(a)(1), the tradi-
tional five-day, forty-hour work week, and if it pays overtime for any
work time performed beyond the regular eight hour day or five day work
week.133
If the employer does elect to use the subsection (k) exemption, how-
ever, allowing for the establishment of a seven to twenty-eight day work
period and a proportional ratio of up to 171 hours of work at regular
rates, the employer can only exclude the meal period for tours of duty of
24 hours or less if the employee is completely relieved from duty and if
the employer complies with § 785.19.13 The relative similarity between
the two regulations prompts the question, "why was the extra provision
placed in § 553.223, the specific provision established for law enforcement
and fire protection personnel?"' 35 It seems axiomatic that this provision
established an added requirement for those employers opting for the ex-
tended hours of service at regular rates and longer work periods-the
added requirement being complete removal from duty.
While the Eleventh Circuit in Avery136 interpreted the inconsistent lan-
guage to mean that the differences in the two regulations resulted in a
lesser burden on the employer, the counter argument is equally plausible.
One might infer that the "completely removed from duty" language con-
soled for those employees subjected to the extended, non-traditional
work periods. Unfortunately, however, the legislative history of the
Amendment and incorporated floor debate fails to answer that question
or offer any rationale for the different language. 37 Thus, any inference is
left to the individual courts to interpret. 38
Interestingly, the Amendment's early interpretation, see 1974 GUIDEBOOK TO FEDERAL
WAGE-HOUR LAWS, supra note 130, at 170, began with the premise that the meal time is
compensable unless certain criteria were met. However, the current version begins with
the definitive statement that meal times are not compensable. Instead, it uses those same
basic criteria as qualifiers couched in slightly different terms. See 29 C.F.R. § 785.19.
132. 29 C.F.R. § 553.223(a).
133. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-207.
134. See 29 C.F.R. § 553.223(b) (1997).
135. 29 C.F.R. §§ 553.223 and 785.19 (1997). The language of the two regulations is
virtually the same, with the added requirement of § 553.223 that the employee is "com-
pletely relieved from duty during the meal period," and § 785.19 that states "the employee
must be completely relieved from duty for the purposes of eating regular meals." Id. (em-
phasis added).
136. See Avery v. City of Talladega, Alabama, 24 F.3d 1337, 1344-45 (11th Cir. 1994).
137. See generally, COMMITtEE REPORT, supra note 10.
138. In 1996, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that under the 11th Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution states are immune from suit in federal court under the FLSA. Accord-
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V. JUDICIAL ANALYSIS OF MEAL TIMES
The judicial analysis of meal periods as compensable time also provides
little guidance to answer the question of how a meal time relates to work
and overtime pay. The U.S. Supreme Court has heard only two cases
relating specifically to the application of FLSA subsection 207(k) exemp-
tion. 139 Those cases dealt with the broad application of the regulation,
rather than any specific definitional questions. Consequently, the court
gave no clear rule of interpretation. Furthermore, an interpretation ap-
parently is not forthcoming because the Supreme Court has indicated its
reluctance to address this issue in prior dicta:
We have not attempted to, and we cannot, lay down a legal formula
to resolve cases so varied in their facts as are the many situations in
which employment involves waiting time. Whether in a concrete case
such time falls within or without the Act is a question of fact to be
resolved by appropriate findings of the trial court. This involves
scrutiny and construction of the working agreements between the
particular parties, appraisal of their practical construction of the
agreement by conduct, consideration of the nature of the service,
and its relation to the waiting time, and all of the surrounding
circumstances. 140
This leaves little doubt that the trial courts will decide whether real
times are compensable on an ad-hoc case-by-case basis.
The case histories reveal that several federal courts have adopted, in
some form or another, the "predominant benefit" test 141 in evaluating
waiting time and determining whether or not the meal time of an em-
ployee is compensable. 142 The basis of this analysis is the Supreme
Court's general wage and hour ruling in Wantock143 in which the court
applied a type of predominant benefits test to the waiting time fire guards
spent while on the employer's premises.144 This test evaluates the restric-
tions placed on the employee and questions whether the time the em-
ployee spent is "primarily for the benefit of the employer."'145
ingly, state employees may only sue their employers under the FLSA in the less favorable
state forum. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54-57 (1996).
139. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976); See also Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
140. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 136-37 (1944) (citations omitted).
141. See Lamon v. City of Shawnee, 972 F.2d 1145, 1156 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. Denied,
507 U.S. 972 (1993). This case developed the "predominant benefit" test, which involved
an interpretation of 29 C.F.R. § 785.19, which provides that "a law enforcement employee
is completely relieved from duty during a meal period... when the employee's time is not
spent predominantly for the benefit of the employer." Id.
142. See generally discussion of court holdings, supra notes 125-27.
143. Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126, 132-33 (1944).
144. See id The firefighters were employed to fight fires only. The men began their
shifts at 8:00 a.m. by punching time cards. For nine hours, including a half hour for lunch,
they inspected, cleaned, and maintained the company's fire fighting equipment. At 5:00
p.m., they punched out. However, the men remained on call in the fire hall on company




Those circuits that have followed the predominant benefits rationale to
evaluate the real time issue have produced varied results. The courts
have looked at, inter alia, the restrictions placed on the employees and
whether the employer controls the time. 146 Integral to this evaluation of
the FLSA application is the interplay between § 785.19 and § 553.223 in
defining meal times.147
The Tenth Circuit was the first court to specifically look at the meal
time issue and attempt to apply some qualitative analysis to the em-
ployee's activities. In Lamon, the court went beyond the bare require-
ments of § 785.19 and examined the particular activities that the
employees performed and the restrictions that the employer placed upon
them.148 The Lamon court clearly adopted the predominant benefits test
stating, "in the § 207(k) context a law enforcement employee is consid-
ered to be completely relieved from duty during a meal period when the
employee's time is not spent predominantly for the benefit of the em-
ployer."'1 49 Citing several restrictions that the employer placed on the
meal period, the Lamon court held that the evidence supported the em-
ployee's compensation claim for the meal period.'50 The court specifi-
cally cited the interaction of § 785.19 and § 553.223 as a factor in
determining the compensability of meal periods. To this end, the em-
ployee must be completely relieved from duty to exclude the time; how-
ever, being on-call and having some limited responsibility does not, in
and of itself, constitute working time.' 5 '
Following the Tenth Circuit's analysis, the Seventh Circuit also adopted
the predominant benefits test.' 52 It examined the interplay of the two
regulations regarding meal times and concluded that slavish adherence to
the regulation's exact wording was neither the intent, nor the function of
the regulation. 153 In overruling the district court, the appellate court
stated, "[t]he examination of compensability should not turn on a crab-
bed comparison between the mealtime restrictions and the necessarily ar-
bitrary, and certainly not all-encompassing, examples in the
regulations.' 54 The court then held that the Lamon standard was indeed
the correct formula for evaluating the compensability of meal time.155
The Alexander court opined that meal time is compensable when the em-
ployee is "unable [to] comfortably and adequately.., pass the mealtime
because the [employee's] time or attention is devoted primarily to official
146. See, e.g., Armitage v. City of Emporia, 982 F.2d 430, 432 (10th Cir. 1992).
147. See Avery v. City of Talladega, 24 F.3d 1337, 1346 (11th Cir. 1994).
148. Lamon v. City of Shawnee, 972 F.2d 1145, 1157-59 (10th Cir. 1992).
149. Id. at 1155 (emphasis added).
150. See id. at 1156 (holding that the evidence points but one way and that no reason-
able inference supports the employer's claim)
151. See id at 1157.
152. See Alexander v. City of Chicago, 994 F.2d 333, 339-40 (7th Cir. 1993).
153. See id. at 336 (overruling the trial court's holding that if the employment activity
did not fit explicitly in the definition's examples, it was not compensable time).
154. Id. at 337.
155. See id. (stating that the appropriate standard is one that sensibly integrates devel-
oping case law with the regulations' language and purpose).
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responsibilities." 156 While this is a far superior method of analysis than
the district court's stringent adherence to the Lee 57 methodology, it ap-
pears to implicitly require active involvement in employment responsibil-
ities to make the time compensable.' 58
Examining this issue several times, the Fifth Circuit addressed the regu-
lations' application both in an Alexander strict adherence methodology 59
and under the Lamon predominant benefits test. For example, the Fifth
Circuit strictly followed the exact wording of the statute and comments,
citing verbatim the examples within § 553.223 in its Lee v. Coahoma
County ruling. Because the court found that employee activity did not
compart precisely with the activity examples, it held the time was not
compensable. 16° This strict adherence rationale does not allow for any
interpretation or evaluation the individual case's unique facts and is
therefore generally considered a minority view.
The circuit split on precisely which methodology to use further illus-
trates the abounding difference of opinions on this issue. For example, in
Henson v. Pulaski County Sheriff Department.,161 the Eighth Circuit did
not recognize the Lamon predominant benefits test but instead reverted
to the Supreme Court's basic analysis from Swift.162 Likewise, in
Monahan v. County of Chesterfield the Fourth Circuit also disagreed with
the Lamon analysis and predominant benefits test.' 63 The Monahan
court held that the employment agreement precluded back pay, but in
dicta stated that meal time is compensable time, as opposed to gap time,
which is not.164 The Second Circuit also had difficulty interpreting the
meal time issue in a private employer case.' 65 The court held that meal
periods are compensable under the FLSA when employees perform du-
ties predominantly for the employer's benefit during a meal break.166
The key distinction from Lamon, however, was not what the workers did
during the meal break, but rather that "the workers' on-site presence
[was] solely for the benefit of the employer and, in their absence, the
company would have to pay others to perform those same services."'1 67
The court correctly recognized that the employer was effectively receiv-
ing free labor by not compensating these workers.1 68
156. IL (quoting Lamon, 972 F.2d at 1155-56).
157. See Lee v. Coahoma County, 937 F.2d 220,225 (5th Cir. 1991), amended and super-
seded by Lee v. Coahoma County, 37 F.3d 1068 (5th Cir. 1993).
158. See generally, infra notes 243-53.
159. See Alexander, 994 F.2d at 339.
160. See Lee, 937 F.2d at 225.
161. 6 F.3d 531, 534 (8th Cir. 1993).
162. See Skimmer v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134, 136-37 (1944).
163. See Monahan v. County of Chesterfield, 95 F.3d 1263, 1267 (4th Cir. 1996); see also
Johnson v. City of Columbia, 949 F.2d 127, 129 (4th Cir. 1991); Bagrowski v. Maryland Port
Auth., 845 F. Supp. 1116, 1119-20 (D. Md. 1994).
164. See Monahan, 95 F.3d at 1269.
165. See Reich v. Southern N.E. Telecomm. Corp., 121 F.3d 58, 63 (2d Cir. 1997).





Further, the Ninth Circuit, while adopting a form of the predominant
benefits test, has been more liberal in its review. Several California state
court cases have held that meal times are compensable; however, these
cases rely principally upon state law and collective bargaining agreement
interpretations. 169 That said, the California Court of Appeals shed some
light on the interpretation of the § 553.223 provision:
Section 553,15 of title 29 of the Code of Federal Regulations pro-
vides in relevant part: ... Where the employer has elected to use the
Section 7(k) exemption,... mealtime cannot be excluded from com-
pensable hours of work where ... the employee is on duty for less
than 24 hours. 170
In another case, the Washington State Supreme Court held that meal
time of Washington state troopers was compensable both under state law
and FLSA standards. 171 The court held that the patrolmen were not free
agents but were instead under the employer's control during meal time.
Therefore, the meal time was work time. 72 In another state court case
from the Ninth Circuit, the Arizona Court of Appeals held that officers'
meal time was work time under a form of the predominant benefits
test.173 In addition to construing meal time as work time, the court also
held that parties could not waive FLSA rights by a collective bargaining
agreement. 74 While these three state court cases interpret both state law
and FLSA application to the meal time issue, they follow the Ninth Cir-
cuit's rationale in evaluating FLSA regulations. 75 The state courts each
used basically the same interpretation of the work time issues and then
reached similar conclusions regarding the compensability of meal times:
meal times are compensable work time.
These examples indicate the circuit's inconsistent interpretation and
demonstrate the need for either a Supreme Court review on the "com-
pletely relieved from duty" language, or a re-evaluation of the initial
Tenth Circuit "predominant benefits" analysis that led to the varied
results.
VI. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
The review and analysis of the subsection (k) exemptions to FLSA will
focus on three primary issues. First, whether the exception was necessary
169. See, e.g., California Association of Highway Patrolmen v. Department of Person-
nel Admin., 229 Cal. Rep. 729,735-36 (Cal. App. 3 Dist. 1986) (holding that the memoran-
dum of understanding precluded the payment of overtime for meal times, but under FLSA
the meal time cannot be excluded from work time).
170. Id. at 737.
171. See Weeks v. Chief of the Wash. State Patrol, 639 P.2d 732, 734 (Wash. 1982).
172. See id at 734.
173. See Prendergast v. City of Tempe, 691 P.2d 726, 730 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984).
174. See id.
175. See Owens v. Local No. 169, Ass'n of W. Pulp and Paper Workers, 971 F.2d 347,
350 (9th Cir. 1992) (addressing the general applicability of FLSA to on-call time for the
first time, the Ninth Circuit used Swift's predominant benefits analysis model as the start-
ing point, but then went to the Tenth Circuit's poisonous tree for further guidance).
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from an economic standpoint, as government employers vehemently pro-
pounded will be discussed. Second, whether including law enforcement
employees was over-inclusive, or whether excluding other public safety
employees was under-inclusive in applying the exemption rationale.
Third, assuming that the statute is neither over- nor under-inclusive,
whether the court's interpretation and analysis in defining work time is
flawed will be addressed. 176
A. Is THE GOVERNMENT EMPLOYER EXEMPTION NECESSARY?
From the embryonic stages of the 1974 FLSA amendment, Congress
diverted the amendment's focus from ensuring the fair treatment of em-
ployees and addressing the employee's needs to the financial impact that
the amendment and its requirements would have on the employer. Con-
gressional hearings were replete with claims of lost services, reduction in
public safety capabilities, and doomsday predictions of financial ruin. 77
While the Supreme Court's ruling in Usery stayed the amendment's im-
pact, the amendment's wage and hour requirements remained intact until
Garcia in 1985. Arguably government employers were negligent, or at
the very least speculative in their anticipation, regarding the amend-
ment's implications. A more accurate characterization, however, is that
they were confident in their belief that the ruling approved employment
practices leading up to the 1974 amendment.1 78
This reliance resulted in a status quo from 1974 until 1985. The Garcia
ruling, however, surprised government employers who were confident in
their outlook 179 by suddenly removing their cloak of protection from the
FLSA. For example, a commentator reviewing the Garcia decision in
1985 noted, "[t]he Court's decision in Garcia was largely unexpected, and
the full ramifications of the decision remain unclear."' 8 0 Despite eleven
years of forewarning that the tides were turning against past employment
practices, this improvident thinking remained. Now facing post Garcia
regulations, government employers once again sought relief from the im-
pact of FLSA compliance. As an example, Los Angeles City Attorney
James Hahn filed a lawsuit against DOL in an attempt to force a phase-in
period for Los Angles' compliance with the regulations.18 The complaint
alleged "'irreparable harm in that the increased salaries and other bene-
fits required by the FLSA and paid to the city's public safety employees
176. It bears suggesting that courts have not properly applied statutory interpretation
principles in analyzing the exemption, but rather have ignored congressional intent and
deviated from the statute's purpose. In doing this, courts have engaged in judicial activism
by attempting to balance the economic realities of enforcing compliance against local gov-
ernment employers, which contravenes legislative intent.
177. See generally, Committee Report, supra note 10.
178. See Fritsch, supra note 67, at 211.
179. See generally, supra note 58 and accompanying discussion.
180. Terence G. Connor & Ronald Witkowski, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority: Public Employers Meet the FLSA, 59 FLA. BJ. 33 (1985).
181. See Los Angeles Files Complaint to Require Phase-In Period for Complying with
FLSA, 162 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at A-2 (Aug. 21, 1985).
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will not be recoverable at law or equity, crucial city services will be aban-
doned or inadequately performed, and significant numbers of city em-
ployees will be involuntarily discharged.""' 82  The complaint also
demonstrated the imprudent thinking of the employers of the time. Spe-
cifically, employers alleged that had they known of the imminent change,
they would have bargained differently with employees in the most recent
contract negotiations. 183 In particular, the city would have negotiated
lower salaries to curb the additional costs of FLSA compliance.1
84
The veracity of the government employers' financial claims is at the
heart of the question: is the FLSA protection of government employers
necessary? In their reply brief in Usery, the appellants alleged that up-
holding the 1974 amendment would increase the cost for police and fire
services from 50% to 100%.185 But, Conrad Fritsch, Senior Economist
for the Minimum Wage Study Commission, estimated a 23% increase as
the worst-case scenario for police and fire employers due to the FLSA
overtime requirements. 186 In a survey of eligible fire protection employ-
ees, only about 10% were eligible for the 23% increase.1 87 Nationally,
the average wage costs pursuant to compliance with the 1974 amendment
would increase no more than 2.8%. 188
Likewise, the same the "sky is falling" post Garcia, predictions ap-
peared somewhat different in reality. Labor forces accused public em-
ployers of exaggerating the impact for political effect.189 Peggy
Connerton, Service Employees International Union Chief Economist, ac-
cused public employers of "'grossly exaggerating. the financial costs of
the FLSA's overtime provisions."' 190 In contrast, the Services Employ-
ees International Union survey of all public employees concluded that
compliance would result in an increase of only "'a fraction of a percent
and at most 2.5 percent of wages."19' The survey further estimated com-
pliance costs at only 0.16 of 1% of the $184 billion wage bills of state and
local governments.192
Furthermore, during congressional testimony, Senator Pete Wilson es-




185. See FRrrsCH, supra note 67, at 211.
186. See id.
187. See id. at 212.
188. See id. (noting that this statistic assumes no change in employment levels or tour
of duty hours, and that the increases would be lowest in the Northeast regions, but consid-
erably higher in the South, North Central and West).
189. See Costs of FLSA's Overtime Provisions Disputed by Unions, Public Employers,
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of dollars. 193 He estimated a $300 million cost to California alone. 194 In
contrast, the DOL estimate of the 1974 Amendment's impact was only
$27 million nationwide.' 95 Recognizing the impact, but somewhat impas-
sively dismissing the local complaints, the DOL stated:
Whatever impact there is, however, is the result of the 1974 Amend-
ments, which, after Congress had considered these same arguments,
expressly extended overtime protection to employees engaged in fire
protection and law enforcement activities. Moreover, the extent to
which the Act will have a cost impact on such public agencies de-
pends, in large part, upon which of the several alternatives open to
them the State and local jurisdictions elect to use.196
Clearly, the true nature of the Amendment's financial impacts were
unknown. Furthermore, based on its statement, the DOL did not view
the impact as a significant impediment to applying FLSA regulations to
local government employers, and as it succinctly pointed out, Congress
implicitly dismissed these concerns by passing the amendment. 97
Also questionable is whether the exemption to government employers
was a necessary solution to a real problem or merely a federal response to
political pressure from state and local governments. When Congress im-
plemented the 1974 amendments, approximately 4% of public sector em-
ployees were receiving wages at or below the minimum wage level.' 98
Based on national wage distributions estimated from the Current Popula-
tion Survey, conducted in May, 1974, the percentage of public sector em-
ployees at or below the minimum wage actually increased to 10.1% in
1980-during the time that Usery stayed enforcement of the FLSA
amendment. 99 This data indicate that during the time period when gov-
ernment employers were exempt from FLSA regulation, more of their
employees were forced into the poverty ranks. Because public sector em-
ployers were not keeping pace with their private sector counterparts or
their workers' wage requirements, they did not need protection from
FLSA. Public sector employers were actually the specific targets of the
FLSA regulations.
Further, Congress's intent in passing the 1974 amendments was to in-
sure government compliance with the rules it was imposing on the private
sector. Senator Williams, during floor debate on S.2747, stated on Febru-
ary 28, 1974, that:
There are a number of reasons to cover employees of State and local
governments. The committee intends that Government apply to it-
193. See 131 CONG. REQ S9489-03 (daily ed. July 15, 1985) (statement of Sen. Wilson).
194. See id. at 39. Sen. Wilson quoted Los Angeles Mayor Tom Bradley in estimating
the cost to Los Angeles alone at $50 million. He then went on to explain that the incre-
mental costs to Los Angeles County would exceed $50 million.
195. See Employees of Public Agencies Engaged in Fire Protection or Law Enforce-
ment Activities, 39 Fed. Reg. 44,142 (1974).
196. IL
197. See id.




self the same standard it applies to private employers .... Equity
demands that a worker should not be asked to work for subminimum
wages in order to subsidize his employer, whether that employer is
engaged in private business or in Government business.20°
This is certainly not a unique position for the federal government to
take. James Madison advocated this equity principle as early as 1790.201
Madison wrote in Federalist No. 57, "'[c]ongress can make no law which
will not have its full operation on themselves and their friends, as well as
on the great mass of the society."2°2 Additionally, Thomas Jefferson
wrote, "'the framers of our constitution... [took] care to provide that the
laws should bind equally on all, and especially that those who make them
shall not exempt themselves from their operation." 20 3
Given the application of the subsection 207(k) exemption, this equal
compliance seems displaced. Congress never intended subsection (k) to
allow government employers to avoid paying overtime wages, but rather
to "soften the impact of the FLSA on the fire protection and law enforce-
ment activities of state and local government .... -204 Thus, state or local
government employers' continued lobbying, and federal legislators con-
tinued granting of immunity from FLSA provisions not only exceeds the
intent of the 1974 Amendment, but also run afoul of the inherent quali-
ties of fairness and equality before the law upon which this nation was
founded.
B. Is THE SUBSECTION 207(K) EXEMPTION OVER-INCLUSIVE OR
UNDER-INCLUSIVE?
On another front, the subsection 207(k) exemption is vulnerable to
criticism based on the breadth of its application. In its present applica-
tion to police and fire employees, the provision may be over-inclusive or
perhaps under-inclusive. This evaluation rests on the intent of Congress'
in presenting the Amendment in its original form and the legislative pro-
cess that created the Amendment's ultimate form.
Placing all law enforcement employees in the "expanded work period"
solution to the proposed amendment appears over-inclusive. Reviewing
the original proposal and floor debate that accompanied the amendment,
concerns regarding the inclusion of public sector employees in FLSA cov-
erage centered on the financial impact of compliance on state and local
government employers.20 5 In his opening remarks, Senator Dominick,
for himself and, his co-sponsor Senator Taft, qualified the issue of govern-
ment employee coverage with the following statement:
The second difference between this bill and the substitute I spon-
sored last year is that this bill would extend [FLSA] coverage to
200. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 10, at 1649.
201. Should Congress Be Above the Law, HERITAGE FOUND. REP., November 2, 1993.
202. Id.
203. Id. (alteration in original).
204. H.R. REP. No. 101-260, at 10 (1989).
205. See Committee Report, supra note 10, at 2.
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some 4.7 million Federal, State, and local government employees not
now covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act .... The extension of
basic minimum wage coverage to additional government employees
since it does not include overtime coverage, would have a relatively
slight cost impact.206
The bill provided a five year phase-in period for law enforcement and
fire protection personnel, ultimately resulting in a 160 hour work period
in 28 days.207 In effect, this would have given all government employees,
public safety employees included, a 40 hour work week or its equivalent
after five years of gradual phase-in. The work schedule provision would
amend section 7 "to provide for overtime averaging over a twenty-eight
day period and a phase down from 48 to 40 hours per week without time-
and-a-half penalty for state and local government employees engaged in
fire protection and law enforcement activities, including security person-
nel in correctional institutions. '208
This indicates that Congress, or at least the Senate, favored a 40 hour
work week for all employees, including government employees. The pro-
posed provision furthered the goal of having FLSA provide both consis-
tency to employment relationships and stability to wages on a national
scale.
In contrast to the Senate version, however, the House version of the
Amendment proposed a total exemption from FLSA coverage for "any
employee of a State or political subdivision of a State engaged in fire
protection or law enforcement activities; or .... -"209 This provision would
effectively eliminate FLSA coverage of these particular employees.
As the amendment progressed through the legislative process, the fi-
nancial impact of FLSA compliance became the heart of the House ver-
sion of the amendment. Reflecting the House's acquiescence to a certain
amount of overtime for police and fire protection employees, Represen-
tative Frenzel stated:
I voted for the House bill because these employees were specifically
exempted. I cannot vote for the conference report, because the
House has accepted the Senate language, and that language would
be disastrous for the municipalities in my area .... Municipal budg-
ets are fine-tuned to municipal levies and levy limits. Municipalities
cannot stand uncertainties .... [For example,] St. Louis Park, Minn.,
a town of 55,000 in the middle of my district, computes its extra costs
over the 5-year period at today's wage and fringe scales to be nearly
$1 million .... Realistically its only alternatives are first, to cut fire-
fighting services or second, to cut some other needed local service
and then decide whether to pay overtime or hire new firefighters.210
206. Committee Report, supra note 10, at 2.
207. See S.1861, 93rd Cong. § 1 (1973).
208. Committee Report, supra note 10, at 55.
209. H.R. 7935, 93rd Cong. § 1 (1973).
210. Committee Report, supra note 10, at 1190.
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Concern over fire department liability, not other public safety services
such as law enforcement or emergency medical care, drove this financial
tug-of-war. In reality, most other service providers use the more tradi-
tional 40 hour work week, as opposed to the "kelley" schedule fire de-
partments use.211 Accordingly, very few law enforcement or emergency
medical employees work more than 168 hours in a 28 day work period.
212
Therefore, the danger lay in the fire protection employees' 24 hour shift
responsibilities, not other public safety services. If it were truly a safety
issue, however, in which response to emergency situations was the con-
cern, why weren't the water, streets, and traffic maintenance personnel
included? Given that a traffic jam or weather related emergency can oc-
cur frequently, these personnel are necessary inclusions to any emergency
situation provision.
In fact, fire department liability was the gravaman of the debates and
comments concerning the subsection (k) exemption. For example, Rep-
resentative Frenzel, in consideration of H.R. 7935 (H. Rep. 93-413),
stated on August 3, 1973, that his primary concerns were the liability ex-
posure of fire protection personnel; in fact, he mentioned no other service
professionals in his comments.213 Representative Keating, who touted his
past government service as a basis for rejecting any bill that provided
overtime for fire protection employees joined Representative Frenzel in
his comments.214 Connecticut Representative Sarasin also echoed a con-
cern for the liability of covering fire department personnel,215 as did Rep-
resentative J. William Stanton.216
Additionally, during Senate debate on March 7, 1974, Senator Williams
stated that the subsection 207(k) exemption was a direct result of "the
specific problems firemen face" by inclusion under FLSA regulation.
217
He added,
211. Kelley schedules are a variation of 24 hours on duty, 48 off duty, taking into con-
sideration that some of the on duty time is spent on personal endeavors such as eating,
sleeping, or watching TV.
212. See FRrrsCH, supra note 67, at 212.
213. See COMMrrrEE REPORT, supra note 10, at 1190-91.
Mr. Frenzel. Mr. Speaker, a review of the conference report has confirmed
my belief that the House conferees have receded to the Senate in some of its
important provisions. The provision most important to me and to my constit-
uents is the one that relates to coverage of public safety and fire fighting
employees ....
Firefighters in my district work 24-hour shifts with 48 hours off. Their total
hours in a normal 28-[day work] week period would be about 228 .... How-
ever, if fire calls occur during the sleep time, this exemption is lost. Since fire
calls are unpredictable, overtime is unpredictable.
Rep. Frenzel's comments continued to explain the burdens of fire protection services if
Congress mandated FLSA compliance. See id.
214. See id. at 1191.
215. See id. Rep. Sarasin related that in the Connecticut state legislature, a similar
provision for wage and overtime provisions created a dilemma when applied to the fire
departments. See id.
216. See id. at 1192. Rep. Stanton stated that the overtime provisions in the conference
bill would "raise havoc in the small towns and communities" in his district. See id.
217. See Committee Report, supra note 10, at 1935.
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[t]he committee believes that these regulations adequately allow for
the unique work schedules of firefighters while providing for those
who daily protect our lives the basic protections of the FLSA. We
believe that these employees are entitled to the same protection of
the act as we are affording all other State and local government
employees.218
Other opposition to the overtime protection included comment from
Senator Dominick, who presented a letter from R.N. Linrothe, director
of the City of Aurora, Colorado, which detailed his specific concern re-
garding fire department scheduling and overtime liability.2 1 9 In addition,
Arizona Senator Fannin expressed concern, stating:
Mr. President, I commend the distinguished Senator from Ohio [Sen-
ator Dominick] for his statement regarding the problems that exist
with respect to the provision in this bill that would apply to firemen.
I had some local officials in my office today, complaining bitterly
about this provision and giving expression about the tremendous cost
involved, when it is not even fair to the firemen.220
Senator Helms' comments dealt exclusively with the burdens of fund-
ing fire department overtime liability balanced against the relatively small
percentage of active fire suppression duties performed 2 ' Likewise, Sen-
ator Tower voiced the concerns of Texans that the liability of funding fire
department overtime provisions would be devastating: "Just to give my
colleagues an example, I have been informed by city officials in Dallas
that this extension of overtime coverage for firemen will cost that city $6
million in its first year." 2
Other examples permeated the Congressional record as the debate on
overtime compliance and municipal finances flourished, but the underly-
ing tenant was clear: funding liability for fire protection personnel was
the critical issue, not funding for law enforcement, emergency medical
personnel, or any other public safety employees. Representative Dent
explained that the issue nearly deadlocked the 1974 Amendment, and
that the Senate gave up public safety coverage to gain concession from
the House.223 He noted:
It will be determined on the national basis of the work schedules of
the firemen on [the] one hand and of the policemen on the other,
because we know that the conditions that obtain in the firefighters'
work schedules are completely different than those worked by
policemen.
Yet, we applied to the police the exact same formula that we applied
to the firemen. We believe that under the conditions we were faced
with, a situation that plainly told the Members of the House that
unless we did something for firemen and policemen, the Senate
218. Id. at 1936.
219. See id. at 1939.
220. lit at 1799.
221. See id. at 1931-34.
222. Id. at 1936.
223. See Committee Report, supra note 10, at 2381-83.
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would move to deadlock the conference.224
Quite obviously, the debate's focus in both the House and Senate was
over the firefighter issue. But Congress was not alone in its recognition
of this emphasis. The Labor Relations Reporter, April 15, 1974, noted
"[tlhe Committee intends this regulation to be applicable to the numer-
ous local fire fighting units which work 24 hour shifts. 225 The Reporter
further stated,
[t]he Senate floor manager expanded upon the intent of this provi-
sion in the debate preceding final passage of the conference report.
Senator Williams noted: "In establishing this 'tour of duty' concept
as a new element of the [FLSA], the conferees were recognizing that
the work schedule of fire fighters is dictated by the needs of the
community. 226
Furthermore, in the Notice of Hearing on the Hours of Work for Fire-
men and Policemen, the DOL set out an interim rule. Although the rule
was to apply to both fire protection and law enforcement employees, the
regulation concludes with "[t]hus for firemen with tours of duty of 24
hours or less no time may be deducted for meals or sleeping."2 27
Although the statute included a law enforcement employees category,
they were not the focal point of the issue nor were they the problem. For
example, after the DOL concluded its study to determine the average
hours for overtime consideration, it assigned law enforcement personnel
the threshold of 171 hours in a 28 day work period.22 8 Another DOL
study concluded, however, that law enforcement personnel nationwide
worked an average of only 165 hours in a 28 day period.229
In summary, political conciliation, not factual comparability, included
law enforcement employees in the exemption from overtime protection
as a means of appeasing the powers that be in the House. Thus, based
upon incomplete knowledge of the true problem, 230 Congress arbitrarily
included law enforcement personnel in the subsection 207(k) exemptions.
Consequently, whether they were properly included remains an unan-
swered question.
Moreover, if Congress intended for the exemption to cover law en-
forcement employees, what is the logical rationale for excluding other
224. Id. at 2383.
225. GERALD M. FEDER, HIGHLIGHTS OF THE NEW WAGE AND HOUR LAW 17 (1974).
226. Id. at 18.
227. 39 Fed. Reg. 17,597 (1974).
228. See 29 C.F.R. § 553.230; see also, 48 Fed. Reg. 40,519 (1983).
229. See FRrrSCH, supra note 67, at 228. Table A-4 indicates that the average hours
state and local law enforcement personnel worked in 1975 (the year of the Department of
Labor 171 hour study) was 165-164 for State and 166 for local. The cited source was U.S.
Department of Labor Employment Standards Administration Non Supervisory Fire Pro-
tection and Law Enforcement Employees in State and Local Government, (Dec., 1975, Ta-
ble 5). See id.
230. See Committee Report, supra note 10, at 2422. Senator Schweiker stated, "One of
the reasons for the strong differences between the House and Senate was, as the Senator
from Ohio pointed out, there is a lack of knowledge of the practices, of the hours of work
and patterns of work that firemen particularly have in their jobs." Id.
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public safety employees? Any emergency situation that a local or state
government faces does not normally necessitate response from a single
agency. Support functions exist for any emergency. Ancillary agencies
include streets and maintenance, water department, traffic signal mainte-
nance, and logistical support personnel. In an emergency situation, pay-
ing one fragment of the government response unit overtime and not the
other is illogical. Yet this is the result of the present statute's application.
C. JUDICIAL ANALYSIS
This final discussion concerns the judicial interpretation analysis ap-
plied to the subsection 207(k) exemption. Assuming that the intended
scope of subsection 207(k) was to include the law enforcement employee,
the exclusion of meal times from compensable work time is still an inap-
propriate exclusion from FLSA coverage.
Public sector employment law litigation focuses almost exclusively on
the application of subsection 207(k).231 The exclusion of meal time from
the definition of hours worked is the overwhelming dispute. The
Supreme Court has explicitly refused to set forth bright-line rules regard-
ing meal time and work time.2 32 In Swift, the Supreme Court noted that
these cases are so fact specific that the trial court and fact finder are bet-
ter able to determine whether meal time is work time.2 33 Leaving the
issue to trial courts resulted in an inherent divergence of opinion. With-
out Supreme Court precedent, any resultant pattern of interpretation
generally follows the first circuit court to interpret an issue. Resulting
legal principles therefore rely upon the fortuity of which court first de-
cides an issue and in what type of case that that decision is made.
1. The Judicial Analysis Fails to Follow Accepted Rules of Statutory
Interpretation
The Tenth Circuit was one of the first courts that tried to quantitatively
address the meal time versus work time issue. In Lamon,2 34 the court
recognized that the compensibility issue revolved around the interplay
between 29 CFR §§ 785.19 and 553.223.235 The crux of the issue is what
standards are used to determine whether the employee is working and
what test is used to interpret work.236
The Lamon court began its analysis by noting the similarity between
the two regulations. They interpreted the more general of the regula-
tions, § 795.19, to apply to all FLSA employee relationships. For the
more specific subsection 207(k) employers, the court applied the more
specific regulation, § 553.223. This standard correctly recognized the dif-
231. See FEDER, supra note 225, at 17.
232. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 137 (1944).
233. See id. at 136-37.
234. See Lamon v. City of Shawnee, 972 F.2d 1145, 1147 (10th Cir. 1992).




ferences between the two employment relationships, and the trial court
correctly applied the more specific regulation in deference to the
employee. 237
Finding the District Court's jury instructions on the proper standard for
applying the "completely relieved from duty" language in § 553.223(b)
improper, the Tenth Circuit abandoned the basic principles of statutory
interpretation. When interpreting a statute, courts must start with the
statute's language,238 and reviewing courts must look first and foremost
to the statute's text.239 Presumably, Congress, in making laws and
changes, intends that its amendments have real and substantial meaning
and effect.240 Accordingly, Congress used the emphatic term "completely
relieved from duty," as opposed to simply "relieved from duty" for a rea-
son. Courts are to enforce statutory language according to its terms 241
and enforce the statute's plain meaning. 242 Absent some contrary indica-
tion, court should assume that words in a statute bear their ordinary, con-
temporary, and common meaning.243
By applying a meaning other than the unambiguous ordinary meaning
of "completely relieved from duty," the court improperly overruled the
trial court and disregarded the jury's findings. It not only overlooked the
plain language of the statute, but also eviscerated the word "completely"
from the statute. Courts must interpret statutes, if possible, to give each
word some operative effect.244 No judicial necessity mandated exceeding
the statute to understand the regulation's meaning. For a statute to be
unambiguous, it need only be plain to anyone reading it and encompass
the conduct at issue.245 Without question, therefore, the terminology
"completely relieved from duty" means what it says. In addition, the re-
ferral to § 785.19, which explains that the employee is not relieved from
duty if he or she performs any duties, whether active or inactive, further
underscores the intent of "completely." Conversely, reconciling an inter-
pretation or construction, which could sustain a conclusion that the
phrase "unless the employee's time is spent predominantly for the benefit
of the employer" is synonymous with "completely relieved from duty," is
difficult.
Therefore, the Tenth Circuit's "predominant benefits test" for evaluat-
ing meal time as work time is an example of improper statutory construc-
tion. Complicating the issue is that other courts and circuits subsequently
used this test, however ill conceived, to determine the compensability of
237. See id.
238. See Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 144 (1995).
239. See United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U.S. 350, 356 (1994).
240. See Stone v. I.N.S., 514 U.S. 386, 397 (1995).
241. See Arkansas v. Farm Credit Serv. of Cent. Ark., 520 U.S. 821, 827 (1997).
242. See United States Nat'l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S.
439, 454 (1993).
243. See Walters v. Metropolitan Educ. Enter., Inc., 519 U.S. 202, 207 (1997).
244. See id. at 209.
245. See Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 60 (1997).
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meal times in other claims. The rotten fruit of the Tenth Circuit's tree has
contaminated the barrel of ensuing cases.
2. The Courts Have Engaged in Judicial Activism
Another criticism of the Tenth Circuit's Lamon decision is that the
court engaged in judicial activism by going beyond the words of the stat-
ute. For unstated reasons, the Tenth Circuit ventured far from the statu-
tory language and essentially acted as a judicial legislature. In a statutory
construction case, the beginning of any analysis must be the language of
the statute itself. When the statute speaks with clarity to the issue, judi-
cial inquiry into the statute's meaning, in all but the most extraordinary
and rare circumstances, ceases. 246 Thus, if the intent of Congress is evi-
dent from the language of the statute, the matter is closed.247
Inquiry must cease when statutory language is unambiguous and the
statutory scheme is coherent and consistent.248 Courts must ordinarily
regard the statute's unambiguous language as conclusive, in the absence
of clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary.249 In Lamon, the
Tenth Circuit took a plainly written protective statute and forced an ob-
tuse interpretation from a prior, factually distinguishable Supreme Court
ruling.250 In so doing, the court ignored the statute's plain language and
rendered it meaningless. This further renders worthless notions of judi-
cial restraint, because courts ordinarily must resist reading into a statute
words or elements that do not appear on its face.251
Under FLSA, the employer who opts for the subsection 207(k) exemp-
tion gains the benefit of a work period expanded up to 28 days, within
which the regular hours of pay threshold is increases to 216 from 171, as
opposed to the regular 40 hour work week under subsection 207(a)(1).252
Furthermore, in subsection 207(k) situations, the meal period provision
specifically states that unless specific restrictions are met, the employer
may not discount meal time for shifts under 24 hours.253 The Lamon
court reasoned that the added requirements were on the employee,
rather than on the employer.254 This statute's logic conflicts with not only
the intent, but with a literal reading of the statute's wording.
In the first proposal of the CFR regulations, the code stated an em-
ployee's complete relief from duty as its only requirement.25 No caveat
existed for bestowing a benefit on the employer by any activity or any
246. See Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 475 (1992).
247. See Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402, 409 (1993).
248. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997).
249. See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 177 (1993).
250. See Lamon v. City of Shawnee, 972 F.2d 1145, 1156-57 (10th Cir. 1992).
251. See Bates v. United States, 522 U.S. 23, 29 (1997).
252. See Lamon, 972 F.2d at 1154; see also 29 U.S.C. § 207(k); 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1).
253. Specifically, the employee must be completely relieved from duty, as well as meet-
ing the requirements of § 785.19. See Lamon, 972 F.2d at 1155-56.
254. See id.
255. See Draft Regulations Applying FLSA to State and Local Public Safety Agencies,
GOV'T EMPLOYEE REL. REP. (BNA) No. 1150, at 192 (Feb. 10, 1986).
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restrictions on activity-the genesis of the "predominant benefits" test.
Subsequent drafts also contained no restrictive language. Evidently, the
code's intention was not to be more generous to employers than the gen-
eral language of § 785.19.
Apparently, Congress' intent in codifying the DOL's rules was to pro-
tect employees from over-reaching employers, who already had the ad-
vantage of expanded work periods. This was an impermissible invasion of
an employee's time, inasmuch as the principles, as well as the language
itself of the FLSA does not allow the employer to claim all of an em-
ployee's time, but only to compensate him for part of it.256
3. The Courts Were Blinded by the Light
An admittedly more subjective suggestion is that the Tenth Circuit was
unable to overcome the doomsday claims of financial ruin the representa-
tives of government employers propounded and therefore attempted to
affix a legal justification to a fiscal dilemma. The Tenth Circuit's seem-
ingly intentional deviation from statutory language in adapting the pre-
dominant benefits test to the meal time issue supports this proposition.
However, Congress also faced a somewhat similar situation and was
guilty of a comparable acquiescence. Following the Garcia ruling in 1985,
the same doomsday prophets of 1974 returned to Congress and offered
predictions of vast financial ruin and massive reductions in public safety
services if Congress did not grant government employers relief from Gar-
cia.257 This was a surprising prediction, or at least premature, because the
provisions that Garcia mandated were yet unimplemented and the gov-
ernment employer had not yet been subject to a fiscal year of operation
under FLSA regulation. Nevertheless, they claimed that government em-
ployers needed a further concession immediately. Ultimately, Congress
relented and granted the subsection 207(o) exception to local government
and state employers-allowing the use of compensation time in lieu of
paying of overtime as a conciliatory response to their post Garcia
pleas.258
Nonetheless, the Tenth Circuit's judicial action overlooked the basic
principle of statutory interpretation that Congress presumably acts inten-
tionally and purposefully when it includes particular language in a stat-
ute.259 Furthermore, courts shall attempt to avoid any statutory
interpretation that renders some words or terms altogether redundant.260
By eliminating the use and meaning of the word "completely" from the
statute's language, the adopting courts went beyond the statute's scope.
Arguably, the predominant benefits test wholly eliminated the code's
256. See Leahy v. City of Chicago, 96 F.3d 228, 234 (7th Cir. 1996) (J. Cudahy,
dissenting).
257. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1995).
258. See 29 U.S.C. § 207(o) (1994).
259. See BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 537 (1994).
260. See United States v. Alaska, 521 U.S. 1, 59 (1997) (citation omitted.
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plain language, replacing it with convoluted common law legislation. This
violates the principal that the courts may only deviate from a statute's
plain language in rare and exceptional circumstances. 2 61 If a statute's
meaning is plain, the reviewing courts must defer to the Congressional
intent expressed in the statute.262 A strong presumption persists that the
plain language of a statute expresses Congress' intent.263
An additional consideration is the Supreme Court rulings in thirty six
other cases, in which it is has interpreted some form of the term or phrase
"relieved from duty.''264 Not one of those cases contained an alternative
interpretation of "relieved from duty" nor did any case apply an appor-
tioned or gradient version of the term's definition and application.265 In
each case, the court applied the ordinary and common meaning to the
word "relieved," which was to release from an obligation, condition, or
restriction.266
Therefore, the logical conclusion is that the Tenth Circuit was exercis-
ing judicial discretion beyond their capacity as a reviewing court. In the
eloquent manner of Justice Cordozo, they were simply unable to distin-
guish between the two filaments in the bulb: (i) plain statutory language;
and (ii) the predicted economic impact.267 The light shone bright for
both, but the court was unable to look beyond the brighter filament of
economic impact and hold for plain statutory language. That bright light
has continued to blind the judiciary as other courts have adopted the
Tenth Circuit's flawed analysis.
VII. CONCLUSION
A. SUMMARY
Based on the over-reaching benefits the application and interpretation
of the subsection 207(k) exemption allows government employers, em-
ployees are losing millions of dollars in wages each year. As every alpha
has its omega, government employers are gaining the benefit of receiving
"free" labor in an equal amount. Based on an approximated average
wage of a metropolitan public safety employee, an individual employee
will lose over $4,000 per year in unpaid overtime wages.268 In the law
261. See Ardestani v. I.N.S., 502 U.S. 129, 135 (1991).
262. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842-43 (1984).
263. See Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981).
264. See, e.g., Perpich v. Department of Defense, 496 U.S. 334 (1990); Breininger v.
Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n Local Union No. 6, 493 U.S. 67 (1989); Jett v. Dallas Ind.
School Dist., 491 U.S. 701 (1989); Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R. Co. v. Railway Labor Exec-
utives' Ass'n, 491 U.S. 490 (1989); Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376 (1986); Thomas v. Arn,
474 U.S. 140 (1985).
265. See cases cited supra note 264.
266. See MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGE DiCrIONARY 988 (10th ed. 1993).
267. See Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 106 (1933) (borrowing the metaphor
from Justice Cordozo's evidentiary ruling in that case).
268. This figure is based on an average hourly wage of $9.00 per hour. One hour of
uncompensated meal time per work day multiplied by fifty (50) work weeks. In addition,
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enforcement profession alone, that amounts to over $2.016 billion in gov-
ernment savings every year.269 Not surprisingly, government employers
are adamant that they need this fiscal benefit. The drastic and deplorable
conditions that first led to consideration of the FLSA back in the dark
days of 1938 are beginning to look more pale as the impact of the more
recent indignities are brought to light.
Furthermore, the government's duplicity is on the one hand forcing pri-
vate employers to keep up with the rate of inflation and personal needs of
their employees through minimum wage regulations, benefit retention
statutes, and labor protection laws,270 while on the other hand granting
immunity or relaxed requirements to government employers. Listening
to the predictions of lost jobs, increased unemployment, minimal assist-
ance value, and increased crime rates that will accompany another mini-
mum wage hike, one might think that the government lobbyists from
1974 and 1985 are back, this time forecasting for business.27' Given the
$2.016 billion savings that past squealing generated for government em-
ployers, this may be a well tested method of gaining legislative support
and generating judicial blindness. One certainly could not blame the pri-
vate sector for trying.
Anyway one slices it, using the subsection 207(k) exemption is a gov-
ernment abuse. It is a financial "golden goose" for the government em-
ployer, an unfair advantage over the private sector employer, and
ultimately a disservice to the tax paying public because, in the end, the
public loses. Whether through costs of litigation brought against the gov-
ernment employer, reductions in work output by government employees,
or simply a detriment to one of the vital responsibilities of government-
public safety, the cost is high.
B. EPILOGUE
In 1996, the Supreme Court ruled in Seminole272 that Congress could
not abrogate the state's sovereign immunity guaranteed under the 11th
Amendment. While the breadth of the Seminole opinion is beyond the
scope of this article, it does merit a brief discussion herein.273 In Semi-
eleven (11) hours of uncompensated overtime exists for every work period of twenty eight
days.
269. See FBI UNIFORM CRIME REPORT, 1994 (Based on 501,823 law enforcement em-
ployees in 9,907 cities nationwide multiplied by the $4,018.50 figure above).
270. See The Politics of Minimum Wages, CHI. TRIB., February 17, 1998, at 10 (President
Clinton proposes another minimum wage hike); Charles Oliver, Do Americans Hate the
Rich?, INVESrOR's Bus. DAILY, February 20, 1998, at Al (Business executives dispute the
need and effects of a minimum wage hike); Max Lyons, A Minimum Wage Gives Families
Minimal Help, Bus. WK., February 23, 1998, at 12 (Economic predictions of lost jobs due
to minimum wage hike).
271. See Lyons, supra note 270.
272. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
273. The opinion was a 5-4 decision, with Justice Stevens writing a dissenting opinion,
and Justice Souter filing a separate dissent, joined by Justices Ginsberg and Breyer. The
distinction between whether Congress exercised power under the 14th Amendment or the
Commerce Clause has somewhat whittled away the decision. See id.
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nole, the Supreme Court struck down 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7), in which
Congress purported to authorize Indian tribes to sue states in federal
court to enforce the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988.274 The state
of Florida argued that this suit violated its sovereign immunity and the
Supreme Court agreed.275
This holding effectively eliminated the federal court's jurisdiction over
a suit brought by individuals against the state for the enforcement of a
federally created statutory right created pursuant to Congress' power
under the Interstate Commerce Clause.276 However, when Congress ex-
ercises power based on section 5 of the 14th Amendment, the state's im-
munity may be abrogated. 277 The test of valid exercise of authority under
Seminole is two fold: first, Congress must unequivocally express an intent
to abrogate the state's immunity; and second, Congress must act pursuant
to a valid exercise of its power.278
Accordingly, all of the circuits that have addressed the issue following
Seminole have held that the FLSA's minimum wage and overtime provi-
sions do not validly abrogate the States' 11th Amendment immunity. The
circuits have rejected explicitly or implicitly, the argument that the wage
and overtime provisions serve a valid 14th Amendment purpose.279 Fur-
thermore, attempts to impute federal jurisdiction by arguing that while
FLSA itself is not based on Congress's power under the 14th Amend-
ment, the enforcement of FLSA regulations is a valid section 5 exercise of
authority have likewise failed.280
The impact of these cases ensures that future claims of FLSA violations
against state employers will be heard in state courts, which arguably are a
more state employer friendly venue. After abdicating the adjudication of
these issues to the states, perhaps the time is ripe for the Supreme Court
to visit the subsection 207(k) exemption and to put an end to this unfortu-
nate distinction. The illusive question remains, does "completely" mean
completely?
274. See Seminole, 517 U.S. at 47.




279. See Powell v. Florida, 132 F.3d 677, 678 (11th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct.
2297 (1998); Quillin v. Oregon, 127 F.3d 1136, 1138-39 (9th Cir. 1997); Close v. New York,
125 F.3d 31, 38 (2d Cir. 1997); Mills v. Maine, 118 F.3d 37, 48-49 (1st Cir. 1997); Aaron v.
Kansas, 115 F.3d 813, 816-18 (10th Cir. 1997); Raper v. Iowa, 115 F.3d 623, 624 (8th Cir.
1997); Wilson-Jones v. Caviness, 99 F.3d 203, 208-11 (6th Cir. 1996); Mueller v. Thompson,
133 F.3d 1063, 1064 (7th Cir. 1997) (stating that, in light of Seminole Tribe, "[tihe only
issue is whether Wisconsin has waived its 11th Amendment immunity from suit in federal
court under the FLSA" and citing Mills, Raper, and Wilson-Jones).
280. See discussion supra note 279 (Three of these courts, however, expressly reserved
the question of whether the Equal Pay Act validly serves a 14th Amendment purpose. See
Mills, 118 F.3d at 48; Aaron, 115 F.3d at 817; Raper, 115 F.3d at 624).
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